HotFuzz: Discovering Algorithmic Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities
  Through Guided Micro-Fuzzing by Blair, William et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
03
41
6v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 F
eb
 20
20
HotFuzz: Discovering Algorithmic Denial-of-Service
Vulnerabilities Through Guided Micro-Fuzzing
William Blair†, Andrea Mambretti∗, Sajjad Arshad‡, Michael Weissbacher∗,
William Robertson∗, Engin Kirda∗, and Manuel Egele†
†Boston University
∗‡Northeastern University
†{wdblair, megele}@bu.edu, ∗{mbr, mw, wkr, ek}@ccs.neu.edu, ‡arshad@iseclab.org
Abstract—Fifteen billion devices run Java and many of them are
connected to the Internet. As this ecosystem continues to grow,
it remains an important task to discover any unknown security
threats these devices face. Fuzz testing repeatedly runs software
on random inputs in order to trigger unexpected program
behaviors, such as crashes or timeouts, and has historically re-
vealed serious security vulnerabilities. Contemporary fuzz testing
techniques focus on identifying memory corruption vulnerabilities
that allow adversaries to achieve either remote code execution or
information disclosure. Meanwhile, Algorithmic Complexity (AC)
vulnerabilities, which are a common attack vector for denial-of-
service attacks, remain an understudied threat.
In this paper, we present HotFuzz, a framework for automatically
discovering AC vulnerabilities in Java libraries. HotFuzz uses
micro-fuzzing, a genetic algorithm that evolves arbitrary Java
objects in order to trigger the worst-case performance for a
method under test. We define Small Recursive Instantiation (SRI)
as a technique to derive seed inputs represented as Java objects
to micro-fuzzing. After micro-fuzzing, HotFuzz synthesizes test
cases that triggered AC vulnerabilities into Java programs and
monitors their execution in order to reproduce vulnerabilities
outside the fuzzing framework. HotFuzz outputs those programs
that exhibit high CPU utilization as witnesses for AC vulnerabil-
ities in a Java library.
We evaluate HotFuzz over the Java Runtime Environment (JRE),
the 100 most popular Java libraries on Maven, and challenges
contained in the DARPA Space and Time Analysis for Cyber-
security (STAC) program. We evaluate SRI’s effectiveness by
comparing the performance of micro-fuzzing with SRI, measured
by the number of AC vulnerabilities detected, to simply using
empty values as seed inputs. In this evaluation, we verified
known AC vulnerabilities, discovered previously unknown AC
vulnerabilities that we responsibly reported to vendors, and
received confirmation from both IBM and Oracle. Our results
demonstrate that micro-fuzzing finds AC vulnerabilities in real-
world software, and that micro-fuzzing with SRI-derived seed
inputs outperforms using empty values.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software continues to be plagued by vulnerabilities that allow
attackers to violate basic software security properties. These
vulnerabilities take myriad forms, for instance failures to en-
force memory safety that can lead to arbitrary code execution
(integrity violations) or failures to prevent sensitive data from
being released to unauthorized principals (confidentiality vio-
lations). The third traditional security property, availability, is
not exempt from this issue. However, denial-of-service (DoS)
as a vulnerability class tends to be viewed as simplistic, noisy,
and easy (in principle) to defend against.
This view, however, is simplistic, as availability vulnerabilities
and exploits against them can take sophisticated forms. Algo-
rithmic Complexity (AC) vulnerabilities are one such form,
where a small adversarial input induces worst-case1 behavior
in the processing of that input, resulting in a denial of service.
While in the textbook example against a hash table an adver-
sary inserts values with colliding keys to degrade the complex-
ity of lookup operations from an expected O(1) to O(n), the
category of AC vulnerabilities is by no means hypothetical.
Recent examples of algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities
include denial of service issues in Go’s elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy implementation [4], an AC vulnerability that manifests
through amplification of API requests against Netflix’ internal
infrastructure triggered by external requests [14], and a denial
of service vulnerability in the Linux kernel’s handling of
TCP packets [3]. The vulnerability in the Linux kernel was
considered serious enough that it was embargoed until OS
vendors and large Linux users such as cloud providers and
content delivery networks could develop and deploy patches.
While these particular vulnerabilities involved unintended CPU
time complexity, AC vulnerabilities can also manifest in the
spatial domain for resources such as memory, storage, or
network bandwidth.
While discovering AC vulnerabilities is notoriously challeng-
ing, program analysis seems like a natural basis for developing
solutions to tackle such issues. In fact, prior research has
started to explore program analysis techniques for finding AC
vulnerabilities in software. Most of this work is based on
manual or static analysis that scales to real world code bases,
but focuses on detecting known sources of AC vulnerabilities,
such as triggering worst case performance of commonly used
data structures [19], regular expression engines [32], [57], [62],
or serialization APIs [21].
Fuzz testing, where a fuzzer feeds random input to a program
under test until the program either crashes or times out, has
historically revealed serious bugs that permit Remote Code-
Execution (RCE) exploits in widely used software such as
1Strictly speaking, it is sufficient for attacks to cause bad behavior, it need
not be “worst-case”.
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operating system kernels, mobile devices, and web browsers.
Recent work has adapted existing state-of-the-art fuzz testers
such as AFL [64] and libFuzzer [7] to automatically slow
down programs with known performance problems. These
approaches include favoring inputs that maximize the length
of an input’s execution in a program’s Control Flow Graph
(CFG) [47], incorporating multi-dimensional feedback that
provides AFL with more visibility into the portions of the
CFG each test case executes the most [37], and augmenting
AFL with symbolic execution to maximize a Java program’s
resource consumption [43]. These recent advances demonstrate
that modern fuzzers can automatically slow down programs
such as sorting routines, hash table operations, and common
Unix utilities.
These recent developments present exciting new directions for
fuzz testing beyond detecting memory corruption bugs. How-
ever, these approaches do not reconcile the traditional fuzzing
objective function of maximizing code coverage (breadth) with
the opposing goal of maximizing a given program or individual
method’s runtime (depth). Indeed, these tools are evaluated
by the slowdown they can achieve for a given program,
as opposed to the amount of code they successfully cover.
Achieving high code coverage on any program under test is
a notoriously difficult task because common program patterns
like comparing input to magic values or checksum tests are
difficult to bypass using fuzzing alone, although program trans-
formation tricks like splitting each comparison into a series
of one byte comparisons [36] or simply removing them from
the program [46] can improve coverage. Augmenting fuzzing
with advanced techniques like taint analysis [50] or symbolic
execution [44], [58] helps overcome these fuzzing roadblocks,
and RedQueen [12] showed how advanced tracing hardware
can emulate these more heavyweight techniques by providing
a fuzzer with enough information to establish correspondence
between program inputs and internal program state. Prior work
has successfully shown fuzz testing can reproduce known AC
vulnerabilities in software, and research continues to produce
innovative ways to maximize code coverage. What is missing
in fuzzing for AC vulnerabilities are techniques to automat-
ically sanitize a program’s execution for AC vulnerabilities,
analogous to how modern fuzzers rely on sanitizers to detect
memory corruption bugs [54]. Current fuzzing approaches in
general lack the ability to automatically fuzz programs at
the method level without the need for manually defined test
harnesses.
This paper proposes micro-fuzzing (a concept analogous to
micro-execution [24]) as a novel technique to automatically
construct test harnesses that allow a fuzzer to invoke methods
and sanitize their execution for AC vulnerabilities. Both AFL
and libFuzzer can fuzz individual methods, but only after
an analyst manually defines a test harness that transforms
a flat bitmap into the types required to call a method. For
AFL this involves defining a C program that reads the bitmap
from standard input, whereas libFuzzer passes the bitmap to
a specific function that it expects will call the method under
test with the appropriate types derived from the bitmap.
In contrast, micro-fuzzing takes whole programs or libraries
as input and attempts to automatically construct a test harness
for every function contained in the input. Observe that this
approach is analogous to micro-execution [24], which executes
arbitrary machine code by using a virtual machine as a test
harness that provides state on-demand in order to run the code
under test. To this end, micro-fuzzing constructs test harnesses
represented as function inputs, directly invokes functions on
those inputs, and measures the amount of resources each input
consumes using model specific registers available on the host
machine. This alleviates the need to define test harnesses
manually, and supports fuzzing whole programs and libraries
by considering every function within them as a possible entry-
point. Furthermore, we sanitize every function’s execution so
that once its observed runtime crosses a configured threshold,
we kill the micro-fuzzing process and highlight the function as
vulnerable. This sanitization highlights functions with potential
AC vulnerabilities out of all the functions micro-fuzzing auto-
matically executes, as opposed to measuring a fuzzer’s ability
to automatically slow-down individual programs or functions.
We implement micro-fuzzing for Java programs in HotFuzz,
which uses a genetic algorithm to evolve method inputs with
the goal to maximize method execution time. Java provides an
ideal platform for evaluating micro-fuzzing because of its wide
use across different domains in industry and the JVM’s support
for introspection allows HotFuzz to automatically generate test
harnesses, represented as valid Java objects, for individual
methods dynamically at runtime. To generate initial popula-
tions of inputs, we devise two different strategies. The Identity
Value Instantiation (IVI) strategy creates inputs by assigning
each actual parameter the identity element of the parameter’s
domain (e.g., 0 for numeric types or “” for strings). In contrast,
Small Recursive Instantiation (SRI) assigns parameters small
values chosen at random from the parameter’s domain. We
use IVI for the sole purpose of providing a baseline for
measuring the effectiveness of using SRI to generate seed
inputs for micro-fuzzing, based on recent recommendations
for evaluating new fuzz testing techniques [33].
Irrespective of how inputs are instantiated, HotFuzz leverages
the EyeVM, an instrumented JVM that provides run-time
measurements at method-level granularity. If micro-fuzzing
creates an input that causes the method under test’s execution
time to exceed a threshold, HotFuzz marks the method as
potentially vulnerable to an AC attack. To validate potential AC
vulnerabilities, HotFuzz synthesizes Java programs that invoke
flagged methods on the suspect inputs and monitors their end-
to-end execution in an unmodified JVM that mirrors a produc-
tion environment. Those programs that exceed a timeout are
included in HotFuzz’s output corpus. Every program contained
in the output corpus represents a witness of a potential AC
vulnerability in the library under test that a human operator can
either confirm or reject. Sanitizing method execution for AC
vulnerabilities based on a threshold mimics the sanitizers used
by modern fuzzers that kill a process whenever an integrity
violation occurs at runtime, but it also introduces false positives
into our results given that it is difficult to configure a proper
timeout that detects only true positives. In our evaluation, we
show that the number of bugs detected by our sanitizer is
concise enough to permit manual analysis of the results.
We evaluate HotFuzz by micro-fuzzing the Java Runtime
Environment (JRE), challenges provided by the DARPA Space
and Time Analysis for Cybersecurity (STAC) program, and
the 100 most popular libraries available on Maven, a popular
repository for hosting Java program dependencies. We identify
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5 intentional (in STAC) and 158 unintentional (in the JRE and
Maven libraries) AC vulnerabilities.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We introduce micro-fuzzing as a novel and efficient tech-
nique for identifying AC vulnerabilities in Java programs
(see Section III-A).
• We devise two strategies (IVI and SRI) to generate seed
inputs for micro-fuzzing (see Section III-A2b).
• We propose the combination of IVI and SRI with micro-
fuzzing to detect AC vulnerabilities in Java programs.
• We design and evaluate HotFuzz, an implementation of
our micro-fuzzing approach, on the Java Runtime Envi-
ronment (JRE), challenges developed during the DARPA
STAC program, and the 100 most popular libraries avail-
able on Maven. Our evaluation results yield previously
unknown AC vulnerabilities in real-world software, in-
cluding 26 in the JRE, 132 across 47 Maven libraries,
including the widely used org.json library, “solve” 5 chal-
lenges from the STAC program, and include confirmations
from IBM and Oracle. In addition, micro-fuzzing with
SRI-derived seed inputs outperforms IVI-derived seed
inputs, measured by the number of AC witnesses detected
(see Section V).
II. BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we briefly describe Algorithmic Complexity
(AC) vulnerabilities, different approaches that detect such
vulnerabilities, the threat model we assume, and the high-level
design goals of this work.
A. AC Vulnerabilities
AC vulnerabilities arise in programs whenever an adversary
can provide inputs that cause the program to exceed desired
(or required) bounds in either the spatial or temporal domains.
One can define an AC vulnerability in terms of asymptotic
complexity (e.g., an input of size n causes a method to store
O(n3) bytes to the filesystem instead of the expected O(n)),
in terms of a concrete function of the input (e.g., an input
of size n causes a method to exceed the intended maximum
150n seconds of wall clock execution time), or in other
more qualitative senses (e.g., “the program hangs for several
minutes”). However, in each case there is a definition, explicit
or otherwise, of what constitutes an acceptable resource con-
sumption threshold.
In this work, we assume an explicit definition of this threshold
independent of a given program under analysis and rely on
domain knowledge and manual filtering of AC witnesses in
order to label those that should be considered as true vul-
nerabilities. We believe that this is a realistic assumption and
pragmatic method for vulnerability identification that avoids
pitfalls resulting from attempting to automatically understand
intended resource consumption bounds, or from focusing ex-
clusively on asymptotic complexity when in practice, as the
old adage goes, “constants matter.” We define an AC witness
to be any input that causes a specific method under test’s
resource consumption to exceed a configured threshold. We
consider any method that has an AC witness to contain an AC
vulnerability.
We recognize that this definition of an AC vulnerability based
on observing a method’s resource consumption exceeding
some threshold will inevitably cause some false positives,
since the chosen threshold may not be appropriate for a
given method under test. Section III presents a strategy for
minimizing false positives by automatically reproducing AC
vulnerabilities in a production environment outside our fuzzing
framework. This step may fail to remove all false positives, and
in our evaluation given in Section V we show that the output
of this validation stage is concise enough to allow an analyst
to manually triage the results. Since we make no assumption
about the methods we test in our analysis, we believe observing
output that consists of less than three hundred test cases is
reasonable for a human analyst.
B. AC Detection
Software vulnerability detection in general can be roughly
categorized as a static analysis, dynamic testing, or some
combination of the two. Static analysis has been proposed to
analyze a given piece of code for its worst case execution time
behavior. While finding an upper bound to program execution
time is certainly valuable, conservative approximations in static
analysis systems commonly result in a high number of false
positives. Furthermore, even manual interpretation of static
analysis results in this domain can be challenging as it is
often unclear whether a large worst-case execution time results
from a property of the code or rather the approximation in
the analysis. Additionally, static analyses for timing analysis
commonly work best for well structured code that is written
with such analysis in mind (e.g., code in a real-time operating
system). The real-world generic code bases in our focus (e.g.,
the Java Runtime Environment), have not been engineered with
such a focus and quickly reach the scalability limits of static
timing analyzers.
Dynamic testing, in particular fuzz testing, has emerged as
a particularly effective vulnerability detection approach that
runs continuously in parallel with the software development
lifecycle [41], [56]. State of the art fuzzers detect bugs by
automatically executing a program under test instrumented
with sanitizers until the program either crashes or times out.
A sanitized program crashes immediately after it violates an
invariant enforced by the sanitizer, such as writing past the
boundary of a buffer located on the stack or reading from
previously freed memory. Once a fuzzer generates a test case
that crashes a given sanitized program under test, the test
case is a witness for a memory corruption bug in the original
program. Since memory corruption bugs may be extended into
exploits that achieve Remote Code Execution or Information
Disclosure, fuzzers offer an effective and automated approach
to software vulnerability detection. When source code is not
available, a fuzzer can still attempt to crash the program under
test in either an emulated or virtualized environment.
Fuzz testing’s utility for detecting memory corruption bugs in
programs is well known, and current research explores how to
maximize both the amount of code a fuzzer can execute and
the number of bugs a fuzzer can find. Unfortunately, defining
a sanitizer that crashes a process after an AC vulnerability
occurs is not as straightforward as detecting memory integrity
violations. This is in part because what constitutes an AC
vulnerability heavily depends on the program’s domain. For
example, a test case that slows down a program by several
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milliseconds may be considered an AC vulnerability for a
low latency financial trading application and benign for a web
service that processes requests asynchronously.
In this work, we propose a sanitizer in HotFuzz that kills a
process after a method’s runtime exceeds a configured thresh-
old. Like sanitizers for memory corruption bugs, this allows us
to save only those test cases that exhibit problematic behavior.
The drawback is that we do not have absolute certainty that
our test cases are actual bugs in the original program and risk
highlighting test cases as false positives. Building a fuzzing
analysis that does not introduce any false positives is notori-
ously difficult, and fuzzers that detect memory corruption bugs
are not immune to this problem. For example, Aschermann et
al. [12] point out that previous evaluations erroneously report
crashing inputs that exhaust the fuzzer’s available memory as
bugs in the original program under test. Furthermore, sanitizers
point out many different sources of bugs including stack
based overflows, use after free, use after return, and heap
based overflows. While the presence of any of these bugs is
problematic, triaging is still required to understand the problem
given in a test case.
C. Fuzzing AC
SlowFuzz [47] and PerfFuzz [37], adapt two state of the art
fuzzers, libFuzzer and AFL, respectively, and demonstrate the
capability to automatically slow down individual programs or
methods implemented in C/C++. Parallel developments also
showed frameworks built on top of AFL can successfully slow
down programs in interpreted languages as well [43].
HotFuzz departs from these previous works by automatically
creating test harnesses during micro-fuzzing, and sanitizing
method execution for AC vulnerabilities. In contrast to these
tools, HotFuzz does not require an analyst to manually define a
test harness in order to fuzz individual methods contained in a
library. This key feature differentiates micro-fuzzing found in
HotFuzz from how AFL or libFuzzer fuzz individual methods.
Since AFL and LibFuzzer only consider test cases consisting
of flat bitmaps, one can fuzz an individual method with AFL
by defining a test harness that transforms a bitmap read from
stdin into function inputs, and with libFuzzer an analyst
implements a C function that takes the test case as input
and must transform it into the types needed to invoke a
function. Observe that this must be done manually, whereas
HotFuzz examines the type signature of the method under
test and attempts to generate the test harness automatically.
To reproduce our evaluation using existing tools, we would
need to manually define approximately 400,000 individual test
harnesses for all the artifacts contained in our evaluation.
SlowFuzz and PerfFuzz both explore how fuzzers can au-
tomatically slow down individual programs. Understanding
what techniques work best to slow down code is neces-
sary to understand how to design a fuzzer to detect AC
vulnerabilities. SlowFuzz observed that using the number of
executed instructions as a test case’s fitness in libFuzzer’s
genetic algorithm can be used to slow down code with known
performance problems, such as sorting routines and hash table
implementations. PerfFuzz went a step further and showed how
incorporating a performance map that tracks the most visited
edges in a program’s CFG can help a fuzzer further slow down
programs.
These approaches take important steps needed to understand
what techniques allow fuzzers to automatically slow down
arbitrary code in order to spot AC vulnerabilities in programs.
At the same time, they lack three important properties for being
used to detect unknown AC vulnerabilities. First, they require
manually defined test harnesses in order to fuzz individual
functions. Second, these fuzzing engines only consider flat
bitmaps as input to the programs under test, and miss the
opportunity to evolve the high level classes of the function’s
domain in the fuzzer’s genetic algorithm. Finally, these tools
are meant to understand what techniques successfully slow
down code the most, and do not provide a method for sanitizing
method execution for AC vulnerabilities and presenting these
results to a human analyst.
D. Optimization
The goal of identifying AC vulnerabilities boils down to
a simple to posit yet challenging to answer optimization
question. “What are concrete input values that make a given
method under test consume the most resources?” One possible
approach to tackle such optimization problems is with the
help of genetic algorithms. A genetic algorithm emulates the
process of evolution to derive approximations for a given
optimization problem. To this end, a genetic algorithm will
start with an initial population of individuals and over the dura-
tion of multiple generations repeatedly perform three essential
steps: i) Mutation, ii) Crossover, and iii) Selection. In each
generation, a small number of individuals in the population
may undergo mutation. Furthermore, each generation will see
a large number of crossover events where two individuals
combine to form offspring. Finally, individuals in the resulting
population get evaluated for their fitness, and the individuals
with the highest fitness are selected to form the population
for the next generation. The algorithm stops after either a
fixed number of generations, or when the overall fitness of
subsequent populations no longer improves. In our scenario
where we seek to identify AC vulnerabilities in Java methods,
individuals correspond to the actual parameter values that are
passed to a method under test. Furthermore, assessing fitness
of a given individual can be accomplished by measuring the
method’s resource consumption while processing the individ-
ual (see Section IV-A). While mutation and crossover are
straightforward to define on populations whose individuals can
be represented as sequences of binary data, the individuals in
our setting are tuples of well-formed Java objects. As such,
mutation and crossover operators must work on arbitrary Java
classes, as opposed to flat binary data (see Section III-A1).
E. Threat Model
In this work, we assume the following adversarial capabilities.
An attacker either has access to the source code of a targeted
program and its dependencies, or a compiled artifact that can
be tested offline. Using this code, the attacker can employ
arbitrary techniques to discover AC vulnerabilities exposed by
the program, either in the program itself or by any library
functionality invoked by the program. Furthermore, we assume
that these vulnerabilities can be triggered by untrusted input.
An adversary can achieve DoS attacks on programs and ser-
vices that utilize vulnerable libraries by taking the information
they learn about a library through offline testing and develop-
ing exploits that trigger the AC vulnerabilities contained in
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library methods used by a victim program. For example, an
adversary could take the test cases produced by our evaluation
(see Section V) and attempt to reproduce their behavior on
programs that utilize the methods. Determining whether an
adversary can transform these test cases into working AC
exploits on victim programs is outside the scope of this work.
F. Design Goals
The goal of our work is to discover AC vulnerabilities in
Java code so that they can be patched before attackers have
the opportunity to exploit them. In particular, we aim for an
analysis that is automated and efficient such that it can run
continuously in parallel with the software development lifecy-
cle on production artifacts. This gives developers insight into
potential vulnerabilities hiding in their applications without
altering their development workflow.
III. HOTFUZZ OVERVIEW
HotFuzz adopts a dynamic testing approach to detecting AC
vulnerabilities, where the testing procedure consists of two
phases: (i) micro-fuzzing, and (ii) witness synthesis and vali-
dation. In the first phase, a Java library under test is submitted
for micro-fuzzing, a novel approach to scale AC vulnerability
detection. In this process, the library is decomposed into
individual methods, where each method is considered a distinct
entrypoint for testing by a µFuzz instance. As opposed to
traditional fuzzing, where the goal is to provide inputs that
crash a program under test, here each µFuzz instance attempts
to maximize the resource consumption of individual methods
under test using genetic optimization over the method’s inputs.
To that end, seed inputs for each method under test are
generated using one of two instantiation strategies: Identity
Value Instantiation (IVI) and Small Recursive Instantiation
(SRI). Method-level resource consumption when executed on
these inputs is measured using a specially-instrumented Java
virtual machine we call the EyeVM. If optimization eventually
produces an execution that is measured to exceed a pre-defined
threshold, then that test case is forwarded to the second phase
of the testing procedure.
Differences between the micro-fuzzing and realistic execution
environments can lead to false positives. The purpose of the
second phase is to validate whether test cases found during
micro-fuzzing represent actual vulnerabilities when executed
in a real Java run-time environment, and therefore reduce the
number of false positives in our final results. This validation
is achieved through witness synthesis where, for each test case
discovered by the first phase, a program is generated that
invokes the method under test with the associated inputs that
produce abnormal resource usage. If the behavior with respect
to resource utilization that was observed during micro-fuzzing
is replicated, then the synthesized test case is flagged as a
witness of the vulnerability that can then be examined by a
human analyst. Otherwise, we discard the synthesized test case
as a false positive.
Figure 1 depicts a graphical overview of the two phases. In
the following, we motivate and describe the design of each
component of the testing procedure in detail.
A. Micro-Fuzzing
Micro-fuzzing represents a drastically different approach to
vulnerability detection than traditional automated whole-
program fuzzing. In the latter case, inputs are generated
for an entire program either randomly, through mutation of
seed inputs, or incorporating feedback from introspection on
execution. Whole-program fuzzing has the significant benefit
that any abnormal behavior—i.e., crashes—that is observed
should be considered as a real bug as by definition all the
constraints on the execution path that terminates in the bug are
satisfied (up to the determinism of the execution). However,
whole-program fuzzing also has the well-known drawback that
full coverage of the test artifact is difficult to achieve. Thus,
an important measure of a traditional fuzzer’s efficacy is its
ability to efficiently cover paths in a test artifact.
Micro-fuzzing strikes a different trade-off between coverage
and path satisfiability. Inspired by the concept of micro-
execution [24], micro-fuzzing constructs realistic intermediate
program states, defined as Java objects, and directly executes
individual methods on these states. Thus, we can cover all
methods by simply enumerating all the methods that comprise
a test artifact, while the difficulty lies instead in ensuring
that constructed states used as method inputs are feasible in
practice.2 In our problem setting, where we aim to preemp-
tively warn developers against insecure usage of AC-vulnerable
methods or conservatively defend against powerful adversaries,
we believe micro-fuzzing represents an interesting and useful
point in the design space that complements whole program
fuzzing approaches. In this work, we consider the program’s
state as the inputs given to the methods we micro-fuzz.
Modeling implicit parameters, such as files, static variables,
or environment variables are outside the scope of this work.
A second major departure from traditional fuzzing is the
criteria used to identify vulnerabilities. Typical fuzzers use
abnormal termination as a signal that a vulnerability might
have been found. In our case, vulnerabilities are represented
not by crashes but rather by excessive resource consumption.
Thus, coverage is not the sole metric that must be maximized
in our case. Instead, HotFuzz must balance between maximiz-
ing a method’s resource utilization in addition to coverage.
Conceptually speaking, implementing resource measurement
is a straightforward matter of adding methods to the existing
Reflection API in Java that toggles resource usage recording
and associates measurements with Java methods. In practice,
this involves non-trivial engineering, the details of which
we present in Section IV. In the following, we describe
how HotFuzz optimizes resource consumption during micro-
fuzzing given dynamic measurements provided by the EyeVM,
our instrumented JVM that provides run-time measurements at
method-level granularity.
1) Resource Consumption Optimization: HotFuzz’s fuzzing
component, called µFuzz, is responsible for optimizing the
resource consumption of methods under test. To do so, µFuzz
uses genetic optimization to evolve an initial set of seed
inputs over multiple generations until it detects abnormal
resource consumption. Traditional fuzzers use evolutionary
algorithms extensively, but in this work we present a genetic
2We note that in the traditional fuzzing case, a similar problem exists in that
while crashes indicate the presence of an availability vulnerability, they do not
necessarily represent exploitable opportunities for control-flow hijacking.
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Fig. 1: Architectural overview of the HotFuzz testing procedure. In the first phase, individual µFuzz instances micro-fuzz each
method comprising a library under test. Resource consumption is maximized using genetic optimization over inputs seeded using
either IVI or SRI. In the second phase, test cases flagged as potential AC vulnerabilities by the first phase are synthesized into
Java programs. These programs are executed in an unmodified JVM in order to replicate the abnormal resource consumption
observed in the first phase. Programs that fail to do so are rejected as false positives. HotFuzz reports those programs that pass
the Synthesis and Validation stage as AC vulnerability witnesses to a human analyst.
optimization approach to fuzzing that departs from prior work
in two important ways. First, as already discussed, traditional
fuzzers optimize an objective function that solely considers
path coverage (or some proxy thereof), whereas in our setting
we are concerned in addition with resource consumption. Prior
work for detecting AC vulnerabilities through fuzz testing
either record resource consumption using a combination of
program instrumentation, CPU utilization, or counting exe-
cuted instructions. In contrast, we record resource consumption
using an altered execution environment (the EyeVM) and
require no modification to the library under test. Second,
traditional fuzzers treat inputs as flat bitmaps when genetic
optimization (as opposed to more general mutation) is applied.
Recall that genetic algorithms require defining crossover and
mutation operators on members of the population of inputs.
New generations are created by performing crossover between
members in prior generations. Additionally, in each generation,
some random subset of the population undergoes mutation with
small probability. Since µFuzz operates on Java values rather
than flat bitmaps, we must define new crossover and mutation
operators specific to this domain as bitmap-specific operators
do not directly translate to arbitrary Java values, which can
belong to arbitrary Java classes.
a) Java Value Crossover: Genetic algorithms create new mem-
bers of a population by “crossing” existing members. When in-
dividual inputs are represented as bitmaps, a standard approach
is single-point crossover: a single offset into two bitmaps
is selected at random, and two new bitmaps are produced
by exchanging the content to the right of the offset from
both parents. Single-point crossover does not directly apply
to inputs comprised of Java objects, but can be adapted in the
following way. Let X0, X1 represent two existing inputs from
the overall population and (x0, x1)0 = x0 and (x0, x1)1 = x1.
To produce two new inputs, perform single-point crossover for
each corresponding pair of values (x0, x1) ∈ (X0, X1) using
(x′0, x
′
1) =
{
C(x0, x1) if (x0, x1) are primitives
(CL(x0, x1), CR(x0, x1)) if (x0, x1) are objects.
Here, C performs one-point crossover directly on primitive
values and produces the offspring as a pair. When x0 and
x1 are objects, CL and CR recursively perform cross-over
on every member attribute in (x0, x1) and select the left and
right offspring, respectively. For example, consider a simple
Java class List that implements a singly linked list. The
List class consists of an integer attribute hd and a List
attribute tl. Crossing an instance of List ~x with another
instance ~y constructs two new lists ~x′ and ~y′ given by
~x′ = CL(~x, ~y) = (hd := C(~x.hd, ~y.hd)0, tl := CL(~x.tl, ~y.tl))
~y′ = CR(~x, ~y) = (hd := C(~x.hd, ~y.hd)1, tl := CR(~x.tl, ~y.tl))
In this example we show how HotFuzz crosses over a List
that holds Integers, but if the type of value stored in the hd
attribute were a complex class T , the crossover operator would
recursively apply crossover to every attribute stored in T .
b) Java Value Mutation: Mutation operators for traditional
fuzzers rely on heuristics to derive new generations, mutating
members of the existing population through random or semi-
controlled bit flips. In contrast, micro-fuzzing requires mutat-
ing arbitrary Java values, and thus bitmap-specific techniques
do not directly apply.
Instead, µFuzz mutates Java objects using the following proce-
dure. For a given Java object x with attributes {a0, a1, . . . , an},
choose one of its attributes ai uniformly at random. Then we
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define the mutation operator M as
a′i =


Mflip bit(ai) if ai is a numeric value,
Minsert char(ai) if ai is a string or array value,
Mdelete char(ai) if ai is a string or array value,
Mreplace char(ai) if ai is a string or array value,
Mswap chars(ai) if ai is a string or array value,
Mmutate attr(ai) if ai is an object.
Each mutation sub-operator above operates on the attribute ai
chosen from the object x. For example, Mflip bit selects a bit
at random in a numeric element and flips it, while Mswap chars
randomly selects two elements of a string or array and swaps
them. In our current implementation, we only consider arrays
of primitive types. The other sub-operators are defined in an
intuitively similar manner.
When an attribute is a class, as opposed to a primitive type or
a string or array, mutation utilizes the Mmutate attr operator.
Mmutate attr recursively applies the mutation operator M to
the chosen attribute ai when ai is an object. After we obtain
the mutated attribute a′i, we produce the mutated object x
′ by
replacing ai with a
′
i in x.
2) Seed Generation: Given suitable crossover and mutation op-
erators, all that remains to apply standard genetic optimization
is the definition of a procedure to generate seed inputs. We
define two such procedures that we describe below: Identity
Value Instantiation (IVI), and Small Recursive Instantiation
(SRI).
a) Identity Value Instantiation: Recent work has proposed
guidelines for evaluating new fuzz testing techniques [33]. One
of these guidelines is to compare any proposed strategy for
constructing seed inputs for fuzz testing with “empty” seed
inputs. Intuitively, empty seed inputs represent the simplest
possible seed selection strategy. Since empty bitmaps do not
directly translate to our input domain, we define IVI as an
equivalent strategy for Java values. The term “identity value”
is derived from the definition of an identity element for an
additive group.
In particular, IVI is defined as
I(T ) =


0 if T is a numeric type,
false if T is a boolean,
”” if T is a string,
{} if T is an array,
Trandom (I(T0), . . . , I(Tn)) if T is a class.
That is, I(T ) selects the identity element for all primitive
types, while for classes I is recursively applied to all parameter
types Ti of a randomly selected constructor for T . Thus, for a
given method under test M , I(M) is defined as I applied to
each of M ’s parameter types.
b) Small Recursive Instantiation: In addition to IVI, we define
a complementary seed input generation procedure called Small
Recursive Instantiation (SRI). In contrast to IVI, SRI generates
random values for each method parameter. However, experi-
ence dictates that selecting uniformly random values from the
entire range of possible values for a given type is not the most
productive approach to input generation. For example, starting
with large random numbers as seed inputs may waste time
executing benign methods that simply allocate large empty data
structures like Lists or Sets. For example, creating a List with
the ArrayList(int capacity) constructor and passing
it an initial capacity of 1<<30 takes over 1 second and requires
over 4GB of RAM. For this reason, we configure SRI with a
spread parameter α that limits the range of values from which
SRI will sample. Thus, SRI is defined as
S(T, α) =


Rnum(−α, α) if T is a numeric type,
{Rchar}
Rnum(0,α) if T is a string,
{S(T, α)}Rnum(0,α) if T is an array,
Trandom (S(T0, α), . . . , S(Tn, α)) if T is a class.
In the above, Rnum(x, y) selects a value at random from the
range [x, y), while Rchar produces a character obtained at
random. Similarly to I , for a given method under test M we
define S(M) as S applied to each of M ’s parameter types.
We note that SRI with α = 0 is in fact equivalent to IVI, and
thus IVI can be considered a special case of SRI. We note
that HotFuzz can be configured with different random number
distributions to alter the behavior of R.
B. Witness Synthesis
Test cases exhibiting abnormal resource consumption are for-
warded from the micro-fuzzing phase of the testing procedure
to the second phase: witness synthesis and validation. The
rationale behind this phase is to reproduce the behavior during
fuzzing in a realistic execution environment using a real
JVM in order to avoid false positives introduced due to the
measurement instrumentation.
In principle, one could simply interpret any execution that ex-
ceeds the configured timeout as evidence of a vulnerability. In
practice, this is an insufficient criterion since the method under
test could simply be blocked on I/O, sleeping, or performing
some other benign activity. An additional consideration is that
because the EyeVM operates in interpreted mode during the
first micro-fuzzing stage (see Section IV-B), a test case that
exceeds the timeout in the first phase might not do so during
validation when JIT is enabled.
Therefore, validation of suspected vulnerabilities in a realistic
environment is necessary. To that end, given an abnormal
method invocation M(v0, . . . , vn), a self-contained Java pro-
gram is synthesized that invokesM by using a combination of
the Reflection API and the Google GSON library. The program
is packaged with any necessary library dependencies and is
then executed in a standard JVM with JIT enabled. Instead
of using JVM instrumentation, the wall clock execution time
of the entire program is measured. If the execution was both
CPU-bound as measured by the operating system and the
elapsed wall clock time exceeds a configured timeout, the
synthesized program is considered a witness for a legitimate
AC vulnerability and recorded in serialized form in a database.
The resulting corpus of AC vulnerability witnesses are reported
to a human analyst for manual examination.
Recall HotFuzz takes compiled whole programs and libraries
as input. Therefore, the witnesses contained in its final output
corpus do not point out the root cause of any vulnerabilities
in a program’s source code. However, the EyeVM can trace
the execution of any Java program running on it (see Sec-
tion IV-A2). Given a witness of an AC vulnerability, we can
trace its execution in the EyeVM in order to gain insight into
the underlying causes of the problem in the program or library.
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In Section V, we use this technique to discover the root cause
for several AC bugs detected by HotFuzz.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe our prototype implementation
of HotFuzz and discuss the relevant design decisions. Our
prototype implementation consists of 5,487 lines of Java code,
1,007 lines of C++ code in the JVM, and 288 lines of Python
code for validating AC witnesses detected by micro-fuzzing.
A. EyeVM
The OpenJDK includes the HotSpot VM, an implementation
of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), and the libraries and
toolchain that support the development and execution of Java
programs. The EyeVM is a fork of the OpenJDK that includes
a modified HotSpot VM for recording resource measurements.
By modifying the HotSpot VM directly, our micro-fuzzing
procedure is compatible with any program or library that runs
on the OpenJDK.
The EyeVM exposes its resource usage measurement capabil-
ities to analysis tools using the Java Native Interface (JNI)
framework. In particular, a fuzzer running on the EyeVM
can obtain the execution time of a given method under test
by invoking the getRuntime() method which we added
to the existing Executable class in the OpenJDK. The
Executable class allows µFuzz to obtain a Java object
that represents the method under test and access analysis
data through our API. This API includes three methods to
control and record our analysis: setMethodUnderTest,
clearAnalysis, and getRuntime.
We chose to instrument the JVM directly because it allows
us to analyze programs without altering them through byte-
code instrumentation. This enables us to micro-fuzz a library
without modifying it in any way. It also limits the amount of
overhead introduced by recording resource measurements.
The EyeVM can operate in two distinct modes to support
our resource consumption analysis: measurement, described
in Section IV-A1, and tracing, described in Section IV-A2.
In measurement mode, the EyeVM records program execution
time with method-level granularity, while tracing mode records
method-level execution traces of programs running on the
EyeVM. HotFuzz utilizes the measurement mode to record
the method under test’s execution time during micro-fuzzing,
while the tracing mode allows for manual analysis of the
suspected AC vulnerabilities produced by HotFuzz.
1) EyeVM Measurement Mode: Commodity JVMs do not pro-
vide a convenient mechanism for recording method execution
times. Prior work has made use of bytecode rewriting [35] for
this purpose. However, this approach requires modifying the
test artifact, and produced non-trivial measurement perturba-
tion in our testing. Alternatively, an external interface such as
the Serviceability Agent [52] or JVM Tool Interface [11] could
be used, but these approaches introduce costly overhead due
to context switching every time the JVM invokes a method.
Therefore, we chose to collect resource measurements by
instrumenting the HotSpot VM directly.
The HotSpot VM interprets Java programs represented in a
bytecode instruction set documented by the JVM Specifica-
tion [10]. During start up, the HotSpot VM generates a Tem-
plate Table and allocates a slot in this table for every instruction
given in the JVM instruction set. Each slot contains a buffer of
instructions in the host machine’s instruction set architecture
that interprets the slot’s bytecode. The Template Interpreter in-
side the HotSpot VM interprets Java programs by fetching the
Java instruction given at the Bytecode Pointer (BCP), finding
the instruction’s slot in the Template Interpreter’s table, and
jumping to that address in memory. The HotSpot VM interprets
whole Java programs by performing this fetch, decode, execute
procedure starting from the program’s entrypoint which is
given by a method called main in one of the program’s classes.
During execution the Template Interpreter also heavily relies
on functionality provided by HotSpot’s C++ runtime.
The HotSpot source code contains an Assembler API that
allows JVM developers to author C++ methods that, when
executed, generate the native executable code required for each
slot in the Template Interpreter. This allows a developer to
implement the functionality for a given bytecode instruction,
such as iadd, by writing a C++ methodm. When the HotSpot
VM starts up, it invokes m, and m emits as output native
code in the host machine’s instruction set architecture that
interprets the iadd bytecode. HotSpot saves this native code
to the appropriate slot so it can use it later to interpret iadd
bytecode instructions. The API available to developers who
author these methods naturally resembles the host’s instruction
set architecture. One can think of this Assembler API as a C++
library that resembles an assembler like GNU as. For example,
if the two arguments to an iadd instruction reside in memory,
a developer can call methods on this API to load the values into
registers, add them together, and store the result on the JVM’s
operand stack. We use this API to emit code that efficiently
records methods’ resource utilization for our analysis.
We instrument the JVM interpreter by augmenting relevant
slots in the Template Interpreter using the same API that
the JVM developers use to define the interpreter. To measure
execution time, we modify method entry and exit to store
the method’s elapsed time, measured by the RDTSC Model-
Specific Register (MSR) available on the x86 architecture,
into thread-local data structures that analysis tools can query
after a method returns. We limit our current implementation
to the x86-64 platform, but this technique can be applied to
any architecture supported by the HotSpot VM. In addition,
we could modify the Template Interpreter further to record
additional resources, such as memory or disk consumption.
Unfortunately, instrumenting the JVM such that every method
invocation and return records that method’s execution time
introduces significant overhead. That is, analyzing a single
method also results in recording measurements for every
method it invokes in turn. This is both unnecessary and
adds noise to the results due to both the need to perform
an additional measurement for each method as well as the
adverse effects on the cache due to the presence of the
corresponding measurement field. Thus, our implementation
avoids this overhead by restricting instrumentation to a single
method under test that µFuzz can change on demand.
In particular, µFuzz stores the current method under test inside
thread-local data. During method entry and exit, the interpreter
compares the current method to the thread’s method under
test. If these differ, the interpreter simply jumps over our
instrumentation code. Therefore, any method call outside our
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analysis incurs at most one comparison and a short jump.
Every time the interpreter invokes a method, our instrumenta-
tion stores the latest value of rdtsc into an attribute Tstart
in the calling thread and increments a depth counter Tdepth. If
the same method enters again in a recursive call, we increment
Tdepth. If the method under test calls another method, it simply
skips over our analysis code. Each time the method under test
returns, we decrement Tdepth. If Tdepth is equal to zero, the
EyeVM invokes rdtsc and the computed difference between
the current value and Tstart is stored inside the calling thread.
Observe that the measured execution time for the method
under test consequently includes its own execution time and
the execution time of all the methods it invokes. This result
is stored inside the method under test’s internal JVM data
structure located in its class’s constant pool. The Assembler
API available in the JVM sources supports all the functionality
needed to implement these measurements, including com-
puting the offsets of C++ attributes, manipulating machine
registers, and storing values to memory.
Every time the JVM invokes a method, the Template Inter-
preter sets up a new stack frame for the method which the
interpreter removes after the method returns. The code that
implements this logic is defined using the same Assembler API
that implements each JVM bytecode instruction. To record our
resource measurements, we insert relevant code snippets into
the Template Interpreter that run every time the EyeVM adds
or removes a stack frame.
The java executable that runs every Java program begins by
loading the HotSpot VM as a shared library into its process
address space in order to run the JVM. Thus, EyeVM can
export arbitrary symbols to expose a JNI interface to analysis
tools implemented in Java. Currently, the EyeVM defines
functions that allow a process to configure the method under
test, poll the method’s most recent execution time, and to
clear the method’s stored execution time. The EyeVM then
simply uses the JNI to bind the methods we added to the
Executable Java class to the native EyeVM functions that
support our analysis.
2) EyeVM Tracing Mode: In addition to measuring method
execution times, EyeVM allows an analyst to trace the execu-
tion of Java programs with method-level granularity. Tracing
provides valuable insight into programs under test and is used
herein to evaluate HotFuzz’s ability to detect AC vulnerabilities
(see Section V). Each event given in a trace represents either
a method invocation or return. Invocation events carry all
parameters passed to the method as input.
In principle, traces could be generated either by instrumenting
the bytecode of the program under test, or through an external
tool interface like the JVMTI. As both of these approaches
introduce significant overhead, we (as for measurement mode)
opt instead for JVM-based instrumentation. That is, modifying
the JVM directly to trace program execution does not require
any modification of the program under analysis and only
requires knowledge of internal JVM data structures.
EyeVM’s tracing mode is implemented by instrumenting the
bytecode interpreter generated at run-time by the HotSpot VM.
Recall that the JVM executes bytecode within a generated
Template Interpreter in the host machine’s instruction set
architecture. In order to generate program traces that record all
methods invoked by the program under test, stubs are added to
the locations in the Template Interpreter that invoke and return
from methods. We note that these are the same locations that
are instrumented to implement measurement mode.
However, while performance overhead is an important factor,
program execution tracing can nevertheless be effectively im-
plemented in the C++ run-time portion of the JVM as opposed
to generating inline assembly as in the measurement case.
Then, during interpreter generation, all that is added to the
generated code are invocations of the C++ tracing functions.
To trace a program under test, we define a trace recording point
as when the program either invokes a method or returns from
one. When a method under test reaches a trace recording point
the JVM is executing in the generated Template Interpreter rep-
resented in x86-64 assembly. Directly calling a C++ function
in this state will lead to a JVM crash, as the machine layout
of the bytecode interpreter differs from the Application Binary
Interface (ABI) expected by the C++ run-time. Fortunately, the
JVM provides a convenient mechanism to call methods defined
in the C++ run-time using the call_VM method available
in the Assembler API. The call_VM method requires that
parameters passed to the C++ function are contained within
general purpose registers. This facility is used to pass a pointer
to the object that represents the method we wish to trace, a
value that denotes whether the event represents an invocation
or return, and a pointer to the parameters passed to the method
under test. All of this information is accessible from the current
interpreter frame when tracing an event. The JVM maintains
an Operand Stack that holds inputs to methods and bytecode
instructions. Internally, a special variable called the Top of the
Stack State (ToSState) allows the JVM to check where the top
of the Operand Stack is located. Before calling our C++ stub to
trace an event, we push the current ToSState onto the machine
stack. Next, we call our C++ tracing function. After the tracing
function returns, we pop the ToSState off the machine stack
and restore it to its original value.
The trace event stub itself collects the name of every invoked
method or constructor, and its parameters. The name of the
method is obtained from the method object the JVM passes to
the stub. The parameters passed to the method under test are
collected by accessing the stub parameters in similar fashion.
The JVM’s SignatureIterator class allows the tracing
function to iterate over the parameter types specified in the
method under test’s signature, and, therefore, ensures that
tracing records the correct parameter types. For each parameter
passed to a method, both its type and value are saved. Values of
primitive types are represented as literals, whereas objects are
represented by their internal ID in the JVM. Within the trace
file, one can find the origin of a given ID from the object’s
constructor in the trace. All of this information is streamed to
a trace file one event at a time.
B. µFuzz
Micro-fuzzing is implemented using a message broker and
a collection of µFuzz instances. Each µFuzz instance runs
inside the EyeVM in measurement mode, consumes methods
as jobs from a queue, and micro-fuzzes each method within its
own process. Over time, micro-fuzzing methods in the same
process might introduce side-effects that prevent future jobs
from succeeding. For example, a method that starts an applet
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could restrict the JVM’s security policy and prevent µFuzz
from performing benign operations required to fuzz future
methods. This occurs because once a running VM restricts
its security policy, it cannot be loosened. To prevent this and
similar issues from affecting future micro-fuzzing jobs, we add
the following probe to every µFuzz instance. Prior to fuzzing
each method received from the job queue, µFuzz probes the
environment to ensure basic operations are allowed. If this
probing results in a security exception, the µFuzz process
is killed and a new one is spawned in its place. Traditional
fuzzers avoid these problems by forking before each test case
so it can run in a fresh state. For a simple Java program that
loops indefinitely, the JVM runs 16 operating system threads.
Constantly forking such a heavily multi-threaded environment
on every test case introduces unnecessary complexity and very
quickly destabilizes our experiments.
We configure each µFuzz instance in the following way to
prevent non-determinism present in the JVM from introduc-
ing unnecessary noise into our experiments. Every µFuzz
instance runs within the EyeVM in interpreted mode in order
to maintain consistent run-time measurements for methods
under test. If µFuzz runs with JIT enabled, our measurement
instrumentation no longer profiles the method under test, but
rather the JVM’s response to fuzzing the method under test.
A JVM with JIT enabled responds by compiling the bytecode
that implements the method under test into equivalent native
code in the host machine’s instruction set architecture and
executes it in a separate code cache. This causes the method
under test’s runtime to change dramatically during micro-
fuzzing and would skew our results. For this reason, we run
µFuzz in the EyeVM in interpreted mode to ensure consistent
measurements.
Upon receiving a method under test, µFuzz queries the
CPUs available by obtaining the process’s CPU affin-
ity mask with sched_getaffinity. µFuzz then calls
sched_setaffinity to pin the thread running the method
under test to the lowest CPU given in the affinity mask. This
confines the method under test to a single CPU for the duration
of micro-fuzzing and also requires that every µFuzz instance
have access to at least two CPUs, one for the method under
test, and the remainder for the JVM’s own threads.
Each time µFuzz successfully invokes the method under test,
it submits a test case for storage in the results database. Every
test case generated by µFuzz consists of the input given to the
method under test and the number of clock cycles it consumes
when invoked on the input. µFuzz interprets exceptions as
a signal that an input is malformed, and therefore all such
test cases are discarded. Ignoring input that causes the method
under test to throw an exception restricts µFuzz’s search space
to that of valid inputs while it attempts to maximize resource
consumption. In a different context, these test cases could be
considered a potential attack vector for triggering DoS, but not
due to an AC vulnerability.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we describe an evaluation of our prototype
implementation of HotFuzz. This evaluation focuses on the
testing procedure’s efficiency in finding AC vulnerabilities in
Java libraries, and additionally considers the effect of seed
input instantiation strategy on micro-fuzzing efficiency. In
particular, we define the performance of micro-fuzzing as
the number of AC vulnerabilities detected in a test artifact
over time, and consider one strategy to outperform another if
the strategy detects more AC vulnerabilities given the same
time budget. In accordance with recently proposed guidelines
for evaluating new fuzz testing techniques [33], we evaluate
our proposed seed selection strategy (SRI) by comparing the
performance of micro-fuzzing with SRI-based seeds to micro-
fuzzing with “empty seed values” (IVI-based seeds).
To the best of our knowledge, including existing fuzzers in
our evaluation that adapt AFL [49] and libFuzzer [31] to
Java programs to detect AC vulnerabilities would require
significant engineering effort both in terms of instrumentation
and designing test harnesses around our artifacts. Furthermore,
the results those tools have achieved on real world code bases
like the JRE or Java libraries appear limited to individual
methods and find bugs that crash the method under test with
a thrown exception, or individual challenges from the STAC
program. For these reasons, we exclude those tools from our
evaluation.
We evaluate HotFuzz over the Java Runtime Environment
(JRE), all challenge programs developed by red teams in the
DARPA Space and Time Analysis for Cybersecurity (STAC)
program, and the 100 most popular libraries available on the
Maven repository. This set of evaluation artifacts presents the
opportunity to detect previously unknown vulnerabilities in
real-world software as well as to validate HotFuzz on programs
for which we have ground truth for AC vulnerabilities.
For the real-world software evaluation, we selected the JRE as
it provides basic functionality utilized by every Java program.
Given Java’s widespread deployment across domains that range
from embedded devices to high performance servers, any
unknown AC vulnerabilities in the JRE present significant
security concerns to programs that utilize those methods.
For this reason, we evaluate HotFuzz over all methods in
the JRE in order to measure its ability to detect unknown
AC vulnerabilities in production software. Specifically, we
consider JRE 1.8.0 181 from Java 8 as a library under test
in our evaluation.
In addition to the JRE, Java programs frequently rely on li-
braries available through the popular Maven Repository, which
as of 2019 hosts 15.1 million artifacts. While this repository
provides a convenient way to download an application’s library
dependencies, it also introduces any unknown vulnerabilities
hiding within them into an application. In order to under-
stand how vulnerable Maven’s libraries are to AC attacks,
we evaluate HotFuzz over the repository’s 100 most popular
libraries. A library’s popularity on Maven is defined by the
number of artifacts that include it as a dependency. For every
Maven library we consider in our evaluation, we micro-fuzz
every method contained in the library, and exclude the methods
contained in its dependencies.
a) Findings Summary: In conducting our evaluation, HotFuzz
detected previously unknown AC vulnerabilities in the JRE,
Maven Libraries, and discovered both intended and unintended
AC vulnerabilities in STAC program challenges. Section V-A
documents the experimental setup used to obtain these find-
ings. Section V-B summarizes how the seed input generation
strategy impacts micro-fuzzing performance, and provides
several detailed case studies of micro-fuzzing results for the
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JRE, STAC challenges, and Maven libraries.
A. Experimental Set Up
We implement HotFuzz as a distributed system running within
an on-premise Kubernetes cluster. The cluster consists of
64 CPUs and 256 GB of RAM across 6 Dell PowerEdge
R720 Servers with Intel Xeon 2.4 GHz Processors. To micro-
fuzz a given library under test, we deploy a set of µFuzz
instances onto the cluster that consume individual methods
from a message broker.
For each individual method under test, each µFuzz instance
creates an initial population of inputs to the method, and runs a
genetic algorithm that searches for inputs that cause the method
under test to consume the most execution time. In addition to
the method under test, every job submitted to HotFuzz requires
configuration parameters given in Table I.
Recall that HotFuzz makes no assumptions about the code
under test, and therefore it is critical to configure timeouts
at each step of this process in order for the whole system
to complete for all methods in a library under test. For this
reason, the parameters (ψ, λ, ω, γ) configured various timeouts
that ensured HotFuzz ran end to end within a manageable time
frame. This is important in order to prevent problems caused
by fuzzing individual methods or calling specific constructors
from halting the entire micro-fuzzing pipeline. We determined
the values for these parameters empirically, and only added
each parameter after we observed a need for each one in
our evaluation. The parameters (π, χ, τ, ǫ, ν) configured the
genetic algorithm (GA) within HotFuzz. In our evaluation,
we assigned these parameters the initial values recommended
for genetic algorithm experiments [22]. Finally, σ configured
the timeout used in the witness validation stage. Observe that
we configured σ, the time required to confirm a witness as
an AC vulnerability, to be half of ω, the time needed to
detect a witness. Our intuition behind this choice is that a
given test case will run much faster with JIT enabled than in
our interpreted analysis environment, and hence the runtime
required to confirm a witness is lower than the time required to
detect it. We use the same parameters for every method under
test and do not tune these parameters for specific methods.
We argue that this provides a generic approach to detecting
AC vulnerabilities in arbitrary Java methods.
To micro-fuzz each library under test, we created a pair
of fuzzing jobs with identical parameters for each method
contained in the library with the exception of the α parameter.
Each pair consisted of one job that used the IVI seed input
generation strategy, and the other used the SRI strategy with
the α parameter which bounds the values used when con-
structing the seed inputs for micro-fuzzing. The libraries under
test that we consider for our evaluation are all 80 engagement
articles given in the STAC program, and every public method
contained in a public class found in the JRE and the 100 most
popular libraries available on the Maven repository. For the
latter, we consider these public library classes and methods
as the interface the library reveals to programs that utilize it.
Therefore, this provides an ideal attack surface for us to micro-
fuzz for potential AC vulnerabilities.
a) Seed Input Strategy: Given the definition of SRI presented
in Section III-A2b, we use the following procedure to con-
struct the initial seed inputs for every method under test M
configured to use SRI in our evaluation. Given the parameter
α, µFuzz instantiates a population of seed inputs of size π
for M as follows. Let N (µ, σ) be a normal random number
distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. For every
primitive type required to instantiate a given class, SRI obtains
a value X ← N (0, α/3). This allows micro-fuzzing to favor
small values centered around 0 that exceed the chosen parame-
ter α with small probability. To be precise, configuring α to be
three times the size of the standard deviation σ of our random
number distribution N makes Pr(|X | > α) < 0.135%. This
ensures that the primitive values we use to instantiate objects
stay within the range [−α, α] with high probability.
B. Experimental Results
In our evaluation, HotFuzz detected 26 previously unknown
AC vulnerabilities in the Java 8 JRE, detects both intended
and unintended vulnerabilities in challenges from the STAC
program, and detects 132 AC vulnerabilities in 47 libraries
from the 100 most popular libraries found on Maven. Table II
breaks down both the total wall-clock time HotFuzz spent
micro-fuzzing the JRE, STAC engagement challenges, and
Maven libraries for each seed selection strategy and reports
micro-fuzzing’s throughput measured by the average number
of test cases produced per hour. We define a test case to be
a single input generated by HotFuzz for a method under test.
Overall, micro-fuzzing with SRI-derived seed inputs required
more time to micro-fuzz the artifacts in our evaluation, but
also produced more test cases overall.
1) Impact of Seed Input Generation Strategy: Table II presents
the results of micro-fuzzing the JRE, all the challenges con-
tained in the DARPA STAC program, and the 100 most
popular libraries available on Maven using both IVI and SRI-
derived seed inputs. Overall, micro-fuzzing with both strategies
managed to invoke 29.17% of the methods contained in the
JRE, 32.96% of the methods given in the STAC program,
and 29.66% of the methods found in the 100 most popular
Maven libraries. As the results indicate, neither seeding strat-
egy is categorically superior to the other, although SRI does
consistently outperform IVI on each of the artifacts included
in our evaluation. For example, when considering the results
over the JRE, SRI identifies 13 vulnerabilities that IVI does
not, compared to the 8 vulnerabilities IVI finds that SRI does
not. At the same time, both strategies are able to find another 5
vulnerabilities. We observe the same pattern in both the STAC
artifacts and Maven libraries we included in our evaluation,
although observe that both strategies were able to solve the
same number of challenges in our experiment over the STAC
articles (see Case Study V-B4). These results indicate that SRI
outperforms IVI as a seed input strategy, and overall the two
approaches are complementary. Furthermore, their combined
results show that relatively simple micro-fuzzing can expose
serious availability vulnerabilities in widely-used software.
Figure 2 visually compares the performance of micro-fuzzing
the JRE, STAC challenges, and the 100 most popular Maven
libraries, using both IVI and SRI-derived seed inputs. From
these results, we see that SRI-derived seed inputs produce a
marginal improvement over IVI inputs, as micro-fuzzing with
SRI-derived seed inputs detects more AC bugs than IVI seed
inputs in each of our evaluation artifacts.
Figure 3 provides a visual comparison between IVI and
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TABLE I: The parameters given to every µFuzz instance. Multiple timeouts prevent HotFuzz from stopping because of individual
methods that may be too difficult to micro-fuzz efficiently.
Parameter Definition Value
α The maximum value SRI will assign to a primitive type when constructing an object 256
ψ The maximum amount of time to create the initial population 5s
λ The time that may elapse betwen measuring the fitness of two method inputs 5s
ω The amount of time required for a method to run in order to generate an AC witness 10s
γ The wall clock time limit for the GA to evaluate the method under test. 60s
π The size of the initial population 100
χ The probability two parents produce offsprint in a given generation 0.5
τ The probability an individual mutates in a generation 0.01
ǫ The percent of the most fit individuals that carry on to the next generation 0.5
ν The number of generations to run the GA 100
σ The amount of time required for an AC witness to run outside the analysis framework in JIT mode in order to confirm it 5s
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Fig. 2: Measuring HotFuzz’s performance while micro-fuzzing the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) (Figure 2a), all of the
challenges given in the DARPA Space and Time Analysis for Cybersecurity (STAC) program (Figure 2b), and the 100 Most
Popular Libraries found in Maven [8] (Figure 2c) using both IVI and SRI-derived seed inputs. Observe that micro-fuzzing with
SRI-derived seed inputs outperforms IVI-derived seed inputs for every artifact contained in our evaluation.
SRI-based micro-fuzzing on a method provided by the JRE
that works on regular expressions. According to the docu-
mentation, the RE.split(String input) method splits
a given string input into an array of strings based on
12
TABLE II: A comparison of fuzzing outcomes when evaluating HotFuzz on Java libraries using IVI and SRI seed inputs.
Library Size AC Witnesses Detected AC Witnesses Confirmed Methods Covered Fuzzing Time (hrs) Throughput (tests/hr)
No. Methods Both IVI SRI Both IVI SRI Both IVI SRI IVI SRI IVI SRI
JRE 91632 6 8 13 5 8 13 23818 2780 1439 14.3 19.5 4389675 3092866
DARPA STAC 67494 34 6 15 5 0 0 8064 847 1162 7.8 8.7 3608741 3172502
Top 100 Maven Libraries 239777 46 38 56 43 35 54 66987 2622 1770 52.9 55.5 5906687 5591106
the regular expression boundaries expressed in the compiled
regular expression instance RE. Figure 3a shows how micro-
fuzzing this method using IVI-based seeds fails to arrive at
a test case that demonstrates the vulnerability. In contrast,
Figure 3b shows how using SRI-based seed inputs allows
HotFuzz to detect the vulnerability. Additionally, we note that
micro-fuzzing with SRI-derived seed inputs requires fewer
test cases than micro-fuzzing with IVI-based seeds. When we
traced the execution of the exploit found by HotFuzz in the
EyeVM in tracing mode, we discovered that the method called
the StringCharacterIterator.isEnd method from
the com.sun.org.apache.regexp.internal pack-
age with alternating arguments indefinitely. We observed the
PoC produced by HotFuzz run for 7 days on a Debian system
with Intel Xeon E5-2620 CPUs before stopping it. We have
disclosed our PoC to Oracle and await their response.
Our evaluation revealed a second AC vulnerability
within the same RE package called subst(String
substituteIn, String substitution) that
substitutes every occurrence of the compiled regular expression
in substituteIn with the string substitution. After
tracing the PoC produced by HotFuzz, we observed that
it has the same underlying problem as RE.split. That
is, it appears to loop indefinitely checking the result of
StringCharacterIterator.isEnd. We observed the
PoC for RE.subst running for 12 days on the same Debian
system on which we tested the RE.split PoC before
stopping it. After reporting the issue to Oracle, they claimed
it is not a security issue since the RE.subst method is
protected and an attacker would have to perform a non-trivial
amount of work to access it. That being said, the test case
generated by HotFuzz is only 579 bytes in size and no method
in the OpenJDK sources utilizes the RE.subst method
outside of the OpenJDK test suite. This method appears to
serve no purpose beyond providing a potential attack surface
for DoS.
2) Case Study: Detecting AC Vulnerabilities with IVI-based
Inputs: Our evaluation revealed the surprising fact that 6
methods in the JRE contain AC vulnerabilities exploitable by
simply passing empty values as input. Figure 6 shows the
6 utilities and APIs that contain AC vulnerabilities that an
adversary can exploit. Upon disclosing our findings to Oracle
they communicated that five of the six methods (lines 1-29)
belong to internal APIs and that no path exists for malicious
input to reach them. They recognized DecimalFormat’s
behavior (lines 31-34) as a functional bug that they will fix
in an upcoming release. Oracle’s assessment assumes that
a malicious user will not influence the input of the public
DecimalFormat constructor. Unless programs exclusively
pass string constants to the constructor as input, this is a
difficult invariant to always enforce.
3) Case Study: Arithmetic DoS in Java Math: As a part of our
evaluation, HotFuzz detected 5 AC vulnerabilities inside the
JRE’s Math package. To the best of our knowledge, no prior
CVEs document these vulnerabilities. We developed proof-
of-concept exploits for these vulnerabilities and verified them
across three different implementations of the JRE from Oracle,
IBM, and Google. The vulnerable methods and classes provide
abstractions called BigDecimal and BigInteger for per-
forming arbitrary precision arithmetic in Java. Any Java pro-
gram that performs arithmetic over instances of BigDecimal
derived from user input may be vulnerable to AC exploits,
provided an attacker can influence the value of the number’s
exponent when represented in scientific notation.
A manually defined exploit on BigDecimal.add in Oracle’s
JDK (Versions 9 and 10) can run for over an hour even
when Just-in-Time (JIT) compilation is enabled. On IBM’s J9
platform, the exploit ran for 4 and a half months, as measured
by the time utility, before crashing. When we exploit the
vulnerability on the Android 8.0 Runtime (ART), execution
can take over 20 hours before it ends with an exception when
run inside an x86 Android emulator.
We reported our findings to all three vendors and received vary-
ing responses. IBM assigned a CVE [2] for our findings. Oracle
considered this a Security-in-Depth issue and acknowledged
our contribution in their Critical Patch Update Advisory [9].
Google argued that it does not fall within the definition of a
security vulnerability for the Android platform.
HotFuzz automatically constructs valid instances of
BigDecimal and BigInteger that substantially slow
down methods in both classes. For example, simply
incrementing 1e2147483647 by 1 takes over an hour
to compute on Oracle’s JDK even with Just-in-Time (JIT)
Compilation enabled. HotFuzz finds these vulnerabilities
without any domain-specific knowledge about the Java Math
library or the semantics of its classes; HotFuzz derived all
instances required to invoke methods by starting from the
BigDecimal constructors given in the JRE.
The underlying issue in the JRE source code that introduces
this vulnerability stems from how it handles numbers expressed
in scientific notation. Every number in scientific notation is
expressed as a coefficient multiplied by ten raised to the
power of an exponent. The performance of arithmetic over
these numbers in the JRE is sensitive to the difference be-
tween two numbers’ exponents. This makes addition over
two numbers with equal exponents, such as 1e2147483647
and 2e2147483647, return immediately, whereas adding
1e2147483647 to 1e0, can run for over an hour on Oracle’s
JVM.
The root cause of this performance overhead lies in how the
JDK transforms numbers during its arithmetic operations [1].
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Fig. 3: Visualization of micro-fuzzing com.sun.org.apache.regexp.internal.RE.split(String input) with
IVI and SRI-derived inputs. Micro-fuzzing with IVI-derived inputs fails to detect a zero-day AC vulnerability in the JRE, while
SRI-derived inputs detect the vulnerability correctly. Observe that the y-axis for graph a is 5 orders of magnitude smaller than
graph b. Graph b shows the test case that triggers the AC vulnerability in the upper-right-hand corner.
clojure=> (inc (BigDecimal. "1e2147483647"))
clojure=> (dec (BigDecimal. "1e2147483647"))
groovy:000> 1e2147483647+1
scala> BigDecimal("1e2147483647")+1
JSONObject js = new JSONObject();
js.put("x", BigDecimal("1e2147483647"));
js.increment("x");
Fig. 4: Proof of concept exploits that trigger inefficient arith-
metic operations for the BigDecimal class in Clojure, Scala,
Groovy, and the org.json library.
For example, suppose a program uses the BigDecimal class
to compute the sum x1×10y1 +x2×10y2 where y1 6= y2. Let
xmin be the coefficient that belongs to the smaller exponent
and xmax the coefficient that belongs to the larger exponent.
The add method first computes the difference |y1 − y2| and
then defines an integer xscaled, an instance of BigInteger
which may represent an integer of arbitrary size, and directly
computes xscaled = xmax × 10
|y1−y2|. This allows the add
method to complete the addition by returning a BigDecimal
represented with a coefficient given by xscaled + xmin and an
exponent given by the smaller of y1 and y2. Unfortunately,
it also opens up the possibility of a significant performance
penalty while computing xscaled that an adversary could
exploit to achieve DoS when the difference between y1 and
y2 is large. In the PoC given above, add must compute
xscaled = 1 × 102147483647 before simply adding it to 1 with
an exponent of 0. Anecdotally, the EyeVM helped pinpoint
this issue by tracing the execution of the PoC. When tracing
1 + 1× 102147483647, the method bigMultiplyPowerTen
started computing 1 × 102147483647 but did not return before
we manually stopped the PoC. This method appeared to be the
source of the performance penalty because it was absent when
tracing 2 × 102147483647 + 1 × 102147483647 which completed
immediately.
After observing this result, we surveyed popular libraries that
use BigDecimal internally, and developed proof of concepts
that exploit this vulnerability as shown in Figure 4. We found
that several general purpose programming languages hosted on
the JVM are vulnerable to this attack along with org.json, a
popular JSON parsing library.
Developers face numerous security threats when they val-
idate input values given as strings. The vulnerabilities we
discussed in this section are especially problematic because
malicious input is perfectly valid, albeit very large, floating
point numbers. If a program performs any arithmetic over a
BigDecimal object derived from user input, then it must take
care to prevent the user from providing arbitrary numbers in
scientific notation. Likewise, these results show that developers
must be careful when converting between these two classes,
as interpreting certain floating point numbers as integers could
suddenly halt their application. This complicates any input
validation that accepts numbers given as strings. Our results
reveal that failure to implement such validation correctly could
allow remote adversaries to slow victim programs to a halt.
After we disclosed this vulnerability to vendors, we observed
that recent releases of the JRE provide mitigations for it. For
example, in JRE build 1.8.0_242, the PoCs we present in
this section immediately end with an exception thrown by the
BigInteger class. Instead of naively computing xscaled,
the new implementation first checks to see if xscaled will
exceed a threshold and, if so, aborts the inefficient computation
with an exception before it can affect the availability of the
overall process. While this defends against the original AC
vulnerability, it also introduces a new opportunity for DoS by
allowing an adversary to trigger exceptions that programs may
fail to properly handle.
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4) Case Study: DARPA STAC Challenges: The DARPA Space
and Time Analysis for Cybersecurity (STAC) program contains
a set of challenge programs developed in Java that test the
ability of program analysis tools to detect AC vulnerabilities.
In this case study, we measure HotFuzz’s ability to automati-
cally detect AC vulnerabilities found in these challenges. We
began by feeding the challenges into HotFuzz which produced
a corpus of test cases that exploit AC vulnerabilities contained
in the challenges.
However, these test cases on their own do not answer the
question of whether a given challenge is vulnerable to an AC
attack, because challenges are whole programs that receive
input from sources such as standard input or network sockets,
and HotFuzz detects AC vulnerabilities at the method level.
Therefore, given a challenge that is vulnerable to an AC attack,
we need a way to determine whether one of its methods
that HotFuzz marks as vulnerable is relevant to the intended
vulnerability.
The STAC challenges provide ground truth for evaluating
HotFuzz in the form of proof-of-concept exploits on challenges
with intended vulnerabilities. We define the following proce-
dure to assess whether HotFuzz can detect an AC vulnerability
automatically. We start by executing each challenge that con-
tains an intended vulnerability in the EyeVM in tracing mode,
and execute the challenge’s exploit on the running challenge.
This produces a trace of every method invoked in the challenge
during a successful exploit. If HotFuzz marks a method M as
vulnerable in the output for challenge C, and M appears in
the trace for C, we count the challenge as confirmed.
When we conducted this experiment on all the challenges
contained in the STAC program vulnerable to AC attacks,
we found that HotFuzz automatically marked 5 out of 36
challenges as vulnerable. One challenge, inandout_2
provides a web service that allows users to order pizzas
online. By running HotFuzz over this challenge, it identifies
multiple methods with AC vulnerabilities in its code. Figure 5
visualizes HotFuzz detecting an AC vulnerability in the
PizzaParameters.subsequentEnergyOf2(int)
method found in the challenge. When we traced the execution
of an exploit that achieved DoS against the pizza service, we
observed the vulnerable method subsequentEnergyOf2
identified by HotFuzz in the exploit’s trace.
5) Case Study: Slow Parsing in org.json: Over the course of
our evaluation HotFuzz detected a previously unknown AC
vulnerability inside the popular org.json library. The vulnerable
method, JSONML.toJSONObject(String) converts an
XML document represented as a string into an equivalent
JSONObject. This method is public, and instructions for its
use in programs can be found in tutorials online [6]. Given
the popularity of the org.json library on Maven, application
developers may unknowingly expose themselves to DoS at-
tacks by simply parsing XML strings into JSON.
Our experimental results obtained by micro-fuzzing the
org.json library also demonstrated the utility of using SRI
seed inputs over IVI seed inputs. Over the course of our
evaluation, test cases evolved from IVI seed inputs failed to
successfully invoke the toJSONObject method after 4,654
test cases. Meanwhile, the 96th SRI-derived seed input suc-
cessfully triggered the vulnerability. The second stage of our
pipeline successfully validated this SRI test case represented
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Fig. 5: Visualization of HotFuzz detecting an AC vulnerability
found inside the inandout 2 challenge in the DARPA STAC
Program. The test case that triggers the AC vulnerability in
the challenge can be found in the upper-right-hand corner.
1 import com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.*;
2
3 Utility.replace("", "", "");
4
5 import java.io.File;
6 import sun.tools.jar.Manifest;
7
8 String xs[] = {"","","","","",""};
9 m = new Manifest();
10 files = new File(new File(""),"");
11 m.addFiles(files, xs);
12
13 import com.sun.imageio.plugins.common.*;
14
15 table = new LZWStringTable();
16 table.addCharString(0, 0);
17
18 import com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.*;
19
20 byte y[] = {0, 0, 0};
21 il = new InstructionList(y);
22 ifi = new InstructionFinder(il);
23 ifi.search("");
24
25 import sun.text.SupplementaryCharacterData;
26
27 int z[] = {0, 0, 0};
28 s = new SupplementaryCharacterData(z);
29 s.getValue(0);
30
31 import java.text.DecimalFormat;
32
33 x = new DecimalFormat("");
34 x.toLocalizedPattern();
Fig. 6: Proof of concept exploits for AC vulnerabilities that
require only IVI-based inputs to trigger.
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as a 242 character string. After our evaluation completed, we
took the PoC program generated by HotFuzz and observed it
running for 120 hours on a Debian system with Intel Xeon
E5-2620 CPUs in an unmodified Java environment with JIT
enabled. The SRI strategy that produced this test case sampled
primitive values uniformly at random from the interval [0, α).
Sampling from the normal distribution N (0, α/3) detected a
bug in the JSONML package, but the test case did not pass the
witness validation stage.
During our evaluation, HotFuzz started with no prior knowl-
edge about org.json, JSON, or XML. Nonetheless, after simply
passing the org.json library to HotFuzz as input and micro-
fuzzing its methods using SRI-derived seed inputs, we were
able to uncover a serious AC vulnerability that exposes pro-
grams that depend on this library to potential DoS attacks. We
communicated our findings to the owners of the JSON-java
project [5] who confirmed the behavior we observed as a bug.
The developers immediately found the root cause of the
infinite loop after debugging the method starting with the test
case produced by HotFuzz. This test case opened an XML
comment with the string <! which prompted a loop inside
the toJSONObject method to check for special characters
that represent the beginning (<) and end (>) of a comment
until it reached the end of the original comment. The test
case produced by HotFuzz caused a method in this loop,
nextMeta, to always return the same character, and therefore
prevented the loop from advancing. After fixing this bug,
the developers included our test case in org.json’s test
suite in order to prevent the issue from occurring in future
releases. The test case that triggered this infinite loop is small
(242 bytes) and demonstrates the potential micro-fuzzing has
to uncover serious AC vulnerabilities hiding in popular Java
libraries. After micro-fuzzing the toJSONObject method on
the patched org.json library, we discovered 6 test cases that
triggered AC vulnerabilities, but these were fixed in the latest
release of org.json.
VI. RELATED WORK
HotFuzz relates to previous work in four categories: (i) AC
Vulnerability Analysis, (ii) Test Case Generation, (iii) Fuzz
Testing, and (iv) Resource Analysis.
A. AC Vulnerability Analysis
Prior work for detecting AC vulnerabilities in Java programs
includes static analysis on popular libraries [32], [38], [62],
object-graph engineering on Java’s serialization facilities [21],
and exploiting worst-case runtime of algorithms found in
commercial grade networking equipment [20]. On the Android
platform, Huang et al. [29] use a combination of static and
dynamic analysis to detect AC vulnerabilities within Android’s
System Server. Further up the application stack, Pellegrino et
al. [45] identify common implementation mistakes that make
web services vulnerable to DoS attacks. Finally, Holland et
al. [28] proposes a 2 stage analysis for finding AC vulnerabil-
ities.
Prior work for detecting AC vulnerabilities is custom-tailored
to specific domains (e.g., serialization, regular-expression en-
gines, Android Services, or web applications) and therefore
often requires human assistance. HotFuzz differs from these
approaches in that it is generically applicable to any Java
program without human intervention, intuition, or insight.
B. Test Case Generation
Program analysis tools can generate test cases that exercise
specific execution paths in a program and demonstrate the pres-
ence of bugs. Several tools perform symbolic execution within
the Java Pathfinder [26] platform [30], [39], [65] in order to
increase code coverage in Java test suites. Symbolic execution
has found serious security bugs when applied to whole pro-
grams [16], [42] and in under-constrained settings [48] similar
to HotFuzz. Toffola et al. [60] introduced PerfSyn which uses
combinatoric search to construct test programs that trigger
performance bottlenecks in Java methods.
C. Fuzz Testing
State of the art fuzzers [7], [64] combine instrumentation
on a program under test to provide feedback to a genetic
algorithm that mutates inputs in order to trigger a crash. Active
research topics include deciding optimal fuzzing seeds [51]
and techniques for improving a fuzzer’s code coverage [17],
[61]. Prior work has seeded fuzzing by replaying sequences of
kernel API calls [25], commands from Android apps to smart
IoT Devices [18], and input provided by human assistants [55].
Recent techniques for improving code coverage during fuzz
testing include introducing selective symbolic execution [58],
control- and data-flow analysis on the program under test [50],
reducing collisions in code coverage measurements [23], and
altering the program under test [46]. Prior work applies ex-
isting fuzz testers to discover AC vulnerabilities in whole
programs [37], [47], and in Java programs by combining fuzz
testing with symbolic execution [43] or seeding black box
fuzzing with information taken from program traces [40]. In
contrast, HotFuzz micro-fuzzes individual methods and uses a
genetic algorithm on individual Java objects in order to find
inputs to these methods that demonstrate the presence of AC
vulnerabilities. This departs from prior approaches that restrict
fuzzing inputs to flat bitmaps.
D. Resource Analysis
Recent interest in AC and side-channel vulnerabilities in-
creased the focus on resource analysis research. In this area,
Proteus [63] presented by Xie et al. and Awadhutkar et al. [13]
study sensitive paths through loops that might represent AC
vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, Kothary [34], [53] investigates
human-machine interaction to improve program analysis for
finding critical paths and side channels. In Comb [27], Hol-
land et al. investigate how to improve computation of all
relevant program behaviors.
Other resource-oriented static analyses have also been pro-
posed [15], [59]. This line of work is based on statically
inferred properties of programs and their resource usage.
In contrast, HotFuzz provides quantitative measurements of
program behavior over concrete inputs in a dynamic, empirical
fashion.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present HotFuzz, a fuzzer that detects
Algorithmic Complexity (AC) vulnerabilities in Java libraries
through a novel approach called micro-fuzzing. HotFuzz uses
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genetic optimization of test artifact resource usage seeded by
Java-specific Identity Value and Small Recursive Instantiation
(IVI and SRI) techniques to search for inputs that demonstrate
AC vulnerabilities in methods under test. We evaluate HotFuzz
on the Java 8 Runtime Environment (JRE), challenge programs
developed in the DARPA Space and Time Analysis for Cyber-
Security (STAC) program, and the 100 most popular libraries
on Maven. In conducting this evaluation, we discovered pre-
viously unknown AC vulnerabilities in production software,
including 26 in the JRE, 132 in 47 Maven Libraries, as well as
both known and unintended vulnerabilities in STAC evaluation
artifacts. Our results demonstrate that the array of testing
techniques introduced by HotFuzz are effective in finding AC
vulnerabilities in real-world software.
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